

Mozambique political process bulletin

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Frelimo 28, Renamo 4 and one cohabitation

Renamo won control of four city administrations – the port cities of Beira and Nacala plus Angoche and Ilha de Moçambique – in what will be a seismic shift in Mozambican politics. This is the first time that any Mozambican elected body has not been controlled by Frelimo. In Marromeu, the president (mayor) will be Renamo and the municipal assembly will be controlled by Frelimo, in the first taste of cohabitation.

However the earthquake was less dramatic than expected. Renamo failed to win several municipalities where it had done well in 1999 national elections.

The test for Mozambican democracy will be whether the Frelimo-controlled national and provincial governments maintain a correct relationship with these cities, or if senior Frelimo officials try to sabotage the new Renamo city governments. A poor precedent was set when Frelimo officials were disruptive and tried to delay the formal announcement of their defeat in Beira.

And all eyes will be on Marromeu. Will Renamo and Frelimo be able to work together in a city coming back to life with the re-opening of the sugar plantations and factory?

Turnout was 28%

Turnout was 28% throughout the country. It ranged from a low of 15% in Nampula to highs of 46% in Mocimboa da Praia and 47% in Moatize. Turnout in the 1999 national elections was 75%, but turnout in the 1998 local elections, which Renamo and much of the opposition boycotted, was 15%. Throughout the world, turnout is much lower in local than national elections, and this occurred here as well.

Local elections in 33 cities

Local elections were held on 19 November in 33 municipalities – 23 cities and 10 towns (vilas). One quarter of Mozambique's population lives in these urban areas. As part of a slow process of decentralisation, these 33 municipalities were given substantial powers over local services and economic development. The first five years of devolved local government was primarily a learning process; the municipalities face a desperate lack of revenue, and municipal leaders too often looked for instructions from national government or Frelimo party leaders. Nonetheless, many created a new sense of civic pride and successfully targeted their initial efforts at local priorities.

Smooth voting but chaotic secret count

Campaigning and the actual voting in Mozambique's second local elections on 19 November ran very smoothly and won high praise from national and international observers, although serious problems were noted with the electoral register.

For the first time, Radio Moçambique did a parallel count, and the broad outline of the results was known by the middle of the next day, 20 November. But the official count proved chaotic and obscure, with political deals and a Renamo walkout.

At the last possible moment permitted by law, in the late afternoon of 4 December, National Election Commission (CNE, Comissão Nacional de Eleições) president Rev Arão Litsure announced the results – and they were riddled with errors.

It took the CNE and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE, Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral) another four days, working in secret, to correct the mistakes and "clean up" the results. Those were posted at the CNE headquarters as required by law but copies were not given to journalists or observers, because they still contained errors, particularly with respect to turnouts. Finally, a somewhat better set of results was published in *Notícias* on 11 December, but that, too, had mistakes.

Between the first and third announcements the CNE changed the number of assembly seats in 11 cities. Furthermore, STAE officials wrongly assumed that the 5% threshold, under which parties in *national* elections only gain seats if they have more than 5% of the vote, applied to local elections as well; in fact, local elections have no threshold. This meant small parties and citizens lists were told they had won seats in only 3 cities, when in fact the later announcement showed they won seats in 9 cities. In the first announcement, Renamo was also denied its seat in Xai-Xai.

As happened in 1999, Renamo members of the National Election Commission (CNE) walked out at the last minute, at 10 pm on Wednesday 3 December. Renamo rejected the result and its CNE members were not present for the announcement by Litsure the next afternoon. But the protest was token and, in contrast to 1999, Renamo CNE members returned to the CNE on Friday 5 December.

The CNE worked in secret and no minutes of meetings have been released. This permitted at least three political deals – the Marromeu cohabitation (see below), giving Renamo extra time to make corrections to its nomination papers, and allowing Artur Vilankulos to stand for Renamo for president of Maputo even though he had failed to meet the requirements. The small parties argue that this allows the two big parties to discriminate against them. With the two big parties meeting in secret together in the CNE, they had candidates disqualified who might have been permitted to stand if they had been given as much leeway as Renamo and their protests were rejected with less consideration.

Renamo protests and demands long count

On Wednesday evening 3 December, Renamo members of the CNE demanded that the CNE start the entire count again, not from the results of district election commissions, but starting from scratch using the 5372 results sheets (editais) from individual polling stations. They also demanded that the count be done manually by CNE members, a process which would take several weeks. When this was refused, Renamo CNE members walked out

Renamo then said it would make a formal protest to the constitutional council on the grounds that article 100 of the election law requires the “comparison” (confrontação) of data from polling stations with the list of polling stations, to ensure that no illicit extra polling stations have been added, and that this requires the process demanded by Renamo CNE members.

In a 4 December statement, the rest of the CNE cited the “impracticality” of the CNE personally comparing the thousands of editais, and said that it acted within the law by delegating this task to STAE and that this was done through the creation of a computer data base used only to make this comparison and not used to produce the final results.

Renamo rejects this, because it does not trust STAE and its director António Carrasco. Many observers back Renamo’s complaint that the computer system used by STAE is opaque and controlled by Frelimo loyalists who do not take kindly for requests for information.

But Renamo came to this late in the day. In parliament Renamo agreed a law which required results within 15 days, and thus made a hand comparison impractical. This has implications for the national election, where there will be 22,000 editais. If the method were used which Renamo enforced in Beira and elsewhere, in which each edital is read out loud by two different people, reading and recording this many editais would take several months, and the law would need to be changed to allow this.

If it took nearly three weeks to tally the votes of less than a million electors, what will happen with six million voters next year?

Political deal on Marromeu

Cohabitation in Marromeu reflects both the reality of the vote and a political deal. The official intermediate result gave the Frelimo candidate for president victory by 2 votes and had Frelimo winning the assembly by 17. A parallel count confirmed the Frelimo victory in the assembly, but gave the Renamo presidential candidate victory by 1 vote.

Marromeu had a high percentage of invalid votes, 8%, and Renamo has made a formal protest that polling station officials had declared invalid many votes which were valid for Renamo. When these were reconsidered by the CNE it could have changed the outcome. In the end, a political deal was made, with both parties in CNE consulting party leaders at higher level. Only a handful of the nulots were reclassified – 14 of 349 in the assembly contest – and instead the split decision was confirmed as a political deal.

Ironically, the final decision to award the presidency to Renamo was only made by the CNE at 2 am on Thursday, after Renamo had already walked out.

6 small parties & citizens lists win seats

Renamo will have seats in all but two municipal assemblies, and is the second largest party in those 31. Six small parties and citizen's lists won seats, the same number as in 1998.

PIMO (Partido Independente de Moçambique, Mozambique Independent Party) won its first ever victories, with single seats in Nampula, Cuamba, and Angoche. PIMO is the only small party outside the Renamo Electoral Union to build a party structure, and this election means it must be taken seriously.

IPADE, the new grouping of Raul Domings (technically a citizens list in this election, but effectively a party, see page 5) won single seats in Beira and Dondo

Five local citizens lists won seats in 1998, but they did not build a base; only two of the five stood again this year and they did badly. In Nacala, Ocina (Organização de Candidaturas Independentes de Nacala-Porto, Organisation of Independent Candidates of Nacala-Port) was reduced from 11 seats in 1998 to just one this year. In Maputo, JPC (Juntos Pela Cidade, Together for the City) will have 5 seats in Maputo compared to 15 in 1998, and it was pushed into third place by Renamo.

Two new citizen’s lists won single seats in this election. UM (Uniao para a Mudança, Union for Change) won a seat in Gurué and UPI (Unidos pela Ilha, United for the Island) will have one seat on Ilha

de Moçambique. In Angoche, GIDA (Grupo Independente de Desenvolvimento de Angoche, Independent Group for Angoche Development) failed to win a seat.

Two significant small parties lost out this time. The Workers Party (PT, Partido Trabalhista), which did best of the small parties not in the Renamo-UE coalition, with 2.7% of the parliamentary vote in 1999 and which was the only small party to win seats in municipal assemblies in 1998 (3 in Xai-Xai and 1 in Maputo), was not able to capitalise on its position and won no seats this time. And UNAMO, which is in parliament as a member of the Renamo-UE coalition but stood separately in local elections, failed to win a seat. Renamo President Dhlakama had initially said Renamo no longer needed the small parties and would stand alone. But after they came together and agreed to put up single lists in all cities, Dhlakama realised they might take votes away from Renamo, so he called for the reestablishment of the coalition. All but UNAMO went back in and stood with Renamo as Renamo-UE.

Shocked Renamo rejects results

“We do not recognise the results, and demand that the elections be annulled,” declared Renamo Secretary General Viana Magalhaes, himself a former member of the CNE, on 4 December. If the elections were not annulled, Renamo would hold demonstrations in all municipalities, he said.

In 10 municipalities Renamo won 60% or more of the vote in the 1999 national elections. Yet it only won four of those cities this year – Nacala, Beira, Angoche and Ilha de Moçambique – and came very close in two others – Marrromeu and Monapo. It was defeated by large majorities in Milange (with 76% of the vote in 1999, seen as Renamo’s safest city), Dondo and Mocuba.

In the week after the election, Renamo was dumbstruck by its unexpectedly poor showing. Absent this year were the angry outbursts and regular press conferences claiming fraud and manipulation that marked the days after the 1999 election. Even a protest by the Renamo parliamentary leadership outside the National Election Commission (CNE) on 3 December seemed token and without spirit. Renamo’s own parallel count confirmed its poor showing in Zambezia and, in general, away from the coast.

Even the walkout from the CNE was the tantrum of a petulant child, and Renamo CNE members meekly returned two days later.

In its state of shock, Renamo’s responses were confused and uncoordinated. For example, in the afternoon of 4 December Magalhaes wanted elections annulled, while earlier in the day he said Renamo only wanted a recount. And party agent Manuel Frank said Renamo was only challenging the results in those cities where its protests had been rejected. (see page 13)

On the morning before results were to be announced, Renamo rejected the election on the grounds of “serious irregularities”. Magalhaes said that the July registration campaign had been badly conducted in areas where Renamo was strong; an issue not raised at the time. He complained about missing registration books on voting day, a point we also note. He claimed that Frelimo was buying 1000s of voters cards from Renamo supporters, which if true, would be a pointless exercise, since people with identity cards can vote even without their voters cards.

Magalhaes also said there was an intimidation on polling day to discourage Renamo voters. He cited Cuamba specifically. Renamo had previously made this allegation, and the *MPPB* checked with national and international observers who were there. All denied that any police sweep had taken place.

He said there was a “major falsification of editais” but could only cite the case of 13 in Beira. Finally, he said the CNE was violating the law by allowing STAE staff to do part of the reclassification of nullos and other procedures in the final count.

One problem for Renamo is that nearly all decisions in the CNE have been taken by consensus, including organisation of the registration, the contentious issue of faxing editais to Maputo, and the counting method within the CNE. This would make Renamo members of the CNE culpable for the “serious irregularities” Magalhaes claimed that all votes had been the dictatorship of the Frelimo majority, but this is false; most decisions were by consensus, which is one reason why the process has been so slow.

Poor results for Raul Domingos

Raul Domingos' emerging political party failed to make an impact, taking only 3% of the vote in Beira and Quelimane and 6% in Dondo, and gaining only two seats in municipal assemblies.

Domingos is a kidnapped railwayman who rose to be the chief Renamo negotiator in the 1990-92 peace talks and then a senior Renamo figure in parliament. After the 1999 election, it was Domingos who negotiated Frelimo's unprecedented offer to allow Renamo governors in three provinces.

By then, however, Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama saw Domingos as a threat. Dhlakama rejected the deal with the government (saying he would accept nothing less than naming six governors) and expelled Domingos from the party.

Domingos remained in parliament as an independent, and set up an NGO called IPADE (Instituto Democrático para a Paz, Democratic Institute for Peace), which drew support from donors hoping Domingos might create the long-hoped-for "third force", neither Frelimo nor Renamo.

Clearly Renamo saw it as a threat, and in the CNE took a particularly strict line on IPADE candidates. Those from Tete and Moatize, both Renamo targets, were excluded.

Technically, IPADE stood as a citizens list in the local elections. But in early October Domingos had already announced the formation of his new party, called PDD (Party for Peace, Democracy and Development). Based on IPADE's poor showing in local elections, PDD will have to work hard to make an impact in 2004 national elections.

Comment

Party organisation was crucial

These local elections prove again that organisation may be more important than leaders for political parties. Renamo lost in places like Mocuba and Milange, where it expected to win, because its supporters did not vote. Over decades, Frelimo has developed a strong party organisation which works between elections to keep up support, and during an election ensures that its core supporters vote.

In Mocuba, Frelimo voters were willing to go out in torrential rain, and Renamo voters were not. Why? Probably because Renamo failed to convince its own supporters that it was worth going out in the rain to throw Frelimo out of office. A effective party needs militants willing to work hard to motivate the broader group of supporters to actually go out and vote. It is not an issue of money, but of people.

Where Renamo did well, it had precisely this organisation. The staunchly pro-Frelimo Sunday newspaper *Domingo* noted on 30 November that even before the start of the official campaign, Renamo militants were going door to door building up support for their candidate Davis Simango, not just in the peripheral areas known to support Renamo, but even in central areas which mainly support Frelimo.

Building up to election day, Renamo had hundreds of young supporters working "tirelessly, night and day". By contrast, notes *Domingo*, in the evening young men in Frelimo t-shirts were in discos and bars, rather than out campaigning.

It seems apparent that Frelimo was able to mobilise its supporters throughout the country, whereas Renamo could only bring out the vote where it put a special effort. Thus turnouts were above average in Nacala, Ilha de Moçambique, Angoche and Mocimboa da Praia where Renamo mobilised. But in municipalities it expected to win because it did well in 1999, but did poorly this year, like Mocuba, Milange and Chimoio, turnout was below average because Frelimo supporters voted and Renamo supporters did not.

The very poor showing of the PT and JPC underlines the point. They won seats in local assemblies in 1998, but did not use that position to build their prominence and convince people that they could be an effective alternate government. Similarly Raul Domingos and IPADE never built an organisation, and did badly.

Joseph Hanlon

Comment

Did voters reward success?

For the *MPPB*, Nacala and Dondo were two tests in this election, because they were particularly well run municipalities with excellent presidents (mayors) in areas where Renamo won more than two-thirds of the vote in 1999 national elections. Because of the Renamo boycott of 1998 local elections, both

presidents and municipal assemblies were Frelimo. Would voters reward the success of a municipal leadership different from their normal party?

Dondo is just down the road from Beira, where Renamo won, yet the respected Frelimo administration retained control in Dondo by a wide margin.

Nacala was widely seen as the best run and most creative local council in Mozambique and its first president, José Caetano, seen as the best president in the first municipal administrations. Renamo responded by putting forward its best candidate, Manuel dos Santos, the head of the local water company and someone with substantial administrative experience in the city. The contest drew a good turnout (36%), and voters seem to have concluded that dos Santos was credible and could continue Caetano's successful efforts.

- Joseph Hanlon

Who runs the election?

The main body running the election is the National Election Commission (CNE, Comissão Nacional de Eleições) composed of a chair nominated by civil society and 18 members nominated by parties in proportion to representation in parliament, which means 10 Frelimo and 8 Renamo. There are also provincial and district or city election commissions, which are smaller but with the same structure. They have a five year term which started this year.

Under each election commission is a Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE, Secretariado Técnico do Administração Eleitoral) which actually does the work. At national level, STAE has been headed by António Carasco since 1998. He is bitterly hated by Renamo and his term finishes at the end of this year. The CNE is required to do an open competition for his successor. It seems likely that other senior and experienced figures will also leave.

How the vote is counted

Votes are first counted in each polling station, in the presence of observers and party delegates, after the closure of the poll. This is the "partial result". A summary of the result (edital) is posted outside the polling station, copies are given to party delegates, and copies are sent to the district or city election commission and to the CNE. In addition, a more detailed record (acta) is submitted.

At district or city level, the election commission adds up the editais and declares an "intermediate result", supposedly within three days. This is done by hand, using columns of figures and calculators. The election commission also faxes copies of the editais to the CNE in Maputo. Editais and actas from the polling stations and editais and actas from the intermediate count are sent to the CNE in Maputo, as are the spoiled ballot papers from all polling stations.

At national level, the CNE does two things. First, faxed editais are entered into a computer and the results tabulated and compared to the intermediate results. Where they are similar, the intermediate result is taken. There was only one case where they were not similar. A polling station cannot have more than 1000 voters, but for the Chimoio municipal assembly, one polling station had more than 1000 votes for Renamo, and it had been included in the intermediate result. This edital was removed and the intermediate result recalculated. In no other case was the computer tally actually used.

Next, the CNE reconsiders all the nullos, which this year were 3.6% of the total vote – more than 40,000 ballot papers in all. The CNE considered one-fifth of these to be valid, and then added those to the intermediate results as declared by the district election commissions. This is the final or "general result". (See below for a discussion of the impact of the nullos.)

Misconduct and bad faith in Beira

Altered and missing editais (polling station results sheets) caused crises during the count in Beira. This led to Frelimo being accused of bad faith and of using tactics of a sort for which it normally accuses Renamo. The final crisis was only resolved when Renamo was magnanimous in victory and made key concessions.

Except in Beira and Ilha de Moçambique, counting at municipality level (intermediate count) went smoothly.

But counting in Beira was halted three times – once when a Renamo technician refused to open the warehouse, once when a Frelimo technician allegedly tried to increase the Frelimo vote on editais (polling station results sheets) and the third time when it was discovered that information on 10 polling stations was missing. The intermediate count was only announced on Thursday 27 November, more than a week after the vote.

The first delay occurred when the Renamo deputy director of STAE (Secretariado Técnico do Administração Eleitoral, Technical Secretariat for Election Administration) in Beira, Jaime Domingos, blocked the count to protest what he thought was an illegal order by the CNE, the National Elections Commission. The CNE had ordered that the results sheets (editais) from polling stations be faxed to Maputo, but Renamo in Beira argued this was illegal, and that editais could only be carried by hand to Maputo. As part of the politicisation of the entire process, there are three keys to the warehouse holding documents which had been collected – one is held by the director of STAE and the other two by the Renamo and Frelimo deputy directors. All three must open the warehouse together. As part of the protest, the Renamo vice president refused to use his key.

According to Samuel Malate, chair of the Sofala Provincial Elections Commission, it took the intervention of Jose de Castro, Renamo vice president of the CNE, who on late Thursday evening instructed Renamo in Beira to collaborate in opening the warehouse.

Counting finally began Friday morning, only to be halted again Friday evening for a second time when Renamo caught a technician falsifying results sheets (editais) in favour of Frelimo as they were being faxed to Maputo – exactly the fraud that Renamo had feared.

The Beira City Election Commission (Comissão de Eleições de Cidade, CEC) worked very slowly, but by agreement, to do the count. CEC members and city STAE officials sat around an oval table. First the Frelimo vice president read out loud each edital, then passed it to the Renamo vice president who read it out loud again. People seated at the table wrote down the numbers and compared them. Finally, the edital was passed over to the fax machine in the corner of the room to be transmitted to Maputo.

On Friday evening a Renamo-nominated STAE technician, Patrick Domingos, said he looked at the STAE technician, Joaquim Albuquerque Lobo, who was sending the faxes and saw him writing. On closer inspection, he found that on 13 editais, the number of votes for the Frelimo candidate for president of Beira, Djalma Lourenco, had been inflated. Where Lourenco had, for example, 42 votes, the technician wrote in a 1 to give him 142 votes. Four of the altered editais had already been faxed to the CNE in Maputo, for tabulation there.

It is a stupid and pointless fraud to attempt, for two reasons. First, it was obvious because he had changed the figures (eg from 42 to 142) but not the number in words (so “four two” had not been changed to “one four two”). Second, the total of votes had not been changed, so the column would no longer add up to the total on the edital, and the ballot paper would be rejected by the CNE computer system in Maputo.

The CEC met all day Saturday, with an angry Renamo arguing that STAE staff had proved themselves to be corrupt and on the side of Frelimo, and that they should not be present while the CEC did the count itself. By late afternoon, however, a consensus was reached to resume the count.

The list of results for both president and municipal assembly were eventually compiled. But on Monday when the lists were checked, it was found that 10 polling stations out of 260 had not been counted, and that the editais and other material could not be found.

After lengthy discussion, the CEC – which has a chair from civil society but a Frelimo majority – agreed to invite Frelimo and Renamo to submit authenticated copies of the 10 missing editais as had been given to the party delegates in those polling stations. If those showed the same information, they would be used.

Renamo quickly submitted its copies on Tuesday morning, but Frelimo did not. The atmosphere in the counting room remained tense. Renamo accused Frelimo of “bad faith”, and said that its copies of the editais should be used to complete the count. Frelimo refused, saying it could not trust the Renamo copies, but declined to supply its own. Tuesday night, CEC president Chacanza Chumano admitted deadlock, and said only the CNE could resolve it. On Wednesday the CNE sent two members, one Frelimo and one Renamo, to Beira.

Eventually, Renamo made the key concession. After discussions involving the CEC, CPE and the CNE pair, Renamo agreed to allow Frelimo to ignore the request of the CEC (to which Frelimo had initially agreed) to supply its copy of the editais. Renamo allowed the results to be announced without the missing 10 polling stations; the altered 13 were included, because they had been considered by the CEC

before being tampered with.

In the end, Renamo accepted that Frelimo should not be allowed to prevent the announcement of a Renamo victory.

Despite the high level of tension, the process was remarkably open, with national and international observers and sometimes also press in the counting room even during the angry debates of the CEC. Only the Wednesday meetings with the CNE pair were closed.

Throughout the week of stop-and-start counting, Renamo supporters ranging from dozens to hundreds kept a peaceful vigil outside the STAE office, and a large group of police kept an eye on the demonstrators. All was peaceful and disciplined, but it also raised the tension.

Renamo's computerised count in Beira

Renamo did a detailed parallel count in Beira, using its copies of the editais. The whole process was computerised and the presentation is particularly clear, with the results of each polling station given in a table running 17 pages.

Indeed, the presentation is clearer and more complete than anything provided by STAE or the National Election Commission. The Renamo version allows observers and others to make a polling station by polling station comparison with their own copies of the editais. Observers who did so said the Renamo list was accurate. Work was completed by Saturday, and perhaps earlier.

Ironically, Renamo refused to allow computerised tabulation of results at local level this year. Instead at district and city level, the numbers were laboriously written down by hand, and then added up with calculators. As well as increasing the possibility of error, it also meant some municipalities could not produce the results in the three days required by law. In Maputo, the count took at least five days.

Yet Renamo itself proved that computer tabulation is feasible, rapid, and, most importantly, gives a very clear output. The *MPPB* suggests that for 2004 national elections, the National Election Commission consider adopting a version of the Renamo system as used in Beira.

Registration books unreliable and confusing

Registration issues dogged this election, despite a successful registration exercise earlier this year. Problems discussed below include moved polling stations, missing registration books, errors in the registration books, and total confusion as to how many people are registered. The EU Election Observation Mission explicitly criticised "the lack of a single reliable voter list" and warned that "the matter of lists has been a political issue in previous elections".

2 million register

Before the national election in 1999, an entirely new national registration of 7.1 million voters was carried out. There were no updates, until 2 million people registered during a 4 week campaign in July. Registration was throughout the country, not just in the cities.

1,308,592 voters registered for the first time. Many are young people who became 18 after the 1999 election. In addition, 237,652 transferred their registration because they had moved house, and 521,275 applied for new cards to replace old ones which had been lost or damaged.

Registration was 92% of that forecast by STAE. In the three northern provinces, registration was above expectations, but lower elsewhere, particularly in areas which had floods in 2000 and 2001 and where STAE had predicted more lost voters cards.

Registration teams in all provinces ran out of film for the photo id cards given to voters, and were forced to register 28,521 voters without giving them cards; of these, 13,174 were in Maputo city. Cards were to be issued later, but less than a quarter of these people actually collected their voters cards. Even without their card, however, they had a right to vote.

New registrations bring the national voters role to either 8.4 million or 9.1 million, depending how it is calculated. Apparently no attempt has been made to remove from the lists people who have died.

Books and polling stations

People are supposed to vote at the same place they register, often a school. Registration books contain space for 1000 names, and when a book is full at any registration location, a new book is started. Each book of 1000 names becomes a single polling station.

The register, the polling station, and the voters card all contain the same number. Thus a voter expects to go to the place where they registered and look for the polling station, typically a school classroom, which has the right number. Voters enter the polling station and hand in their voters card. Their name is ticked on the register and they are given ballot papers.

There was a national registration in 1999 and an update this year, which used new registration books. Usually the new books were assigned to new polling stations. This led to the widely noted phenomenon of a few school classrooms with queues and most without. Observers everywhere noted that a much higher percentage of new registrants voted, leading to queues at 2003 polling stations and not 1999 ones.

Where there are two books with less than 1000 names in total, they are usually combined into a single polling with two numbers.

Both 1999 and 2003 registers have been computerised, but polling stations were expected to have both the blue covered original hand-written book and the white covered computer register. This meant many polling stations had four different register books.

Errors meant 1000s couldn't vote

Errors in the registration books combined with missing books meant that thousands of people were denied the right to vote. The problems were reported by observers and journalists throughout the country.

Registration brigades made many mistakes, writing wrong or different names in the book and on the card, writing wrong numbers on the card (either of the book or the voter), or worst of all, issuing a card but forgetting to write the name in the book. When the books are computerised a whole new set of errors occurs. Again names are misspelled or transposed. Some are repeated or left out, leading to a shift in the numbering in the register.

It became obvious that there were so many errors in the register and on 3 November the CNE approved instruction 40, which says, in effect, that anyone with a voters card can vote so long as their name is somewhere in one of the registers, hand-written or computerised.

This allowed many people to vote, but others were still excluded. A major problem was that the original 1999 hand-written registers were missing from many polling stations, which only had the computerised versions. This made it impossible to check the original book.

Observers saw a significant number of people arrive at polling stations with cards which had the number of that polling station, but the voter was not in any register. Instruction 40 seems clear, that these people are not allowed to vote. But the position was confused. At a press conference the day before the election CNE chair Rev Arão Litsure said these people would be allowed to vote. It was the fault of the registration brigades and voters cannot be penalised for that, he explained. The result was total confusion, with some polling stations allowing these people to vote, and others sending them home.

In some places, where people arrived with cards with the same number, only the first to arrive was allowed to vote, on the grounds that the number had then been ticked. This was seen by our correspondents in Manica and Beira.

- In Vilanculos, voting in some polling stations was disrupted for up to an hour, when the head of Renamo's delegates instructed them to refuse to allow the use of the computerised registers and insist on only using the original hand-written ones.

Moved polling stations and missing books

Voters are supposed to vote in the same place where they registered. But there were multiple reports this year of polling stations being moved, typically from one school to another one kilometre or more

away. Voters arrive, search the school in vain, seek out someone who might know, and then are sent to another school. Many of the foreign observers, in particular, reported this. One observer told of his experience in Maputo. "I saw an old man arrive at the Commercial School, where he was told his polling station had moved to Malhangalene, which is 1 km away and up the hill. I am sure he did not vote."

Some of the changes seem to be intentional, for example, where there are not enough classrooms in a school; some are the result of disorganisation where two polling stations are swapped by mistake; and some seem to be totally accidental because of confusion with registration books.

Registration books are contained in the "kits" – the metal trunks of material supplied to each polling station. But in nearly all cities, there were reports of missing registration books or a books being sent to the wrong place. In most cases, books were near to the correct polling stations, although some were only delivered in the afternoon, meaning many people did not wait and did not vote. A few polling stations must have opened very late or not at all.

- Renamo in Nampula city has filed a formal protest about moved polling stations and misplaced registration books, which it says was common enough to affect the outcome. Renamo alleges that Frelimo targeted polling stations which had the highest vote for Renamo in 1999. (It is indeed possible to identify such polling stations.) Nampula's turnout of 15% was surprisingly low.

Observer concern at CNE, registers

"Some shortcomings in the administration of the elections should be addressed. In particular, the handling of the voters' lists, the way CNE operates, and complaint and appeals mechanisms. ... the lack of a single reliable voter list remains a matter of concern."

- EU Election Observation Mission

"It is hoped that election authorities [will] establish a single consolidated voter roll."

- Carter Center

How many voters are there?

Registration figures are totally confused, and it is impossible to tell how many potential voters there really are. This also creates confusion as to how many seats there should be in municipal assemblies. In principle, it should be simple. In the 33 municipalities, there were 1,828,716 registered voters in 1999. This year, 373,326 new voters registered in the municipalities, giving a total of 2,202,042 voters this year.

Well, almost. In fact the CNE says there are 6850 more, namely 2,208,892. This is the figure published by the CNE on 20 August 2003 as the official figure, along with similarly calculated figures for the 33 cities. These were used to calculate how many signatures, 1% of the total, were needed for presidential candidates, and also the number of seats in the municipal assembly, which is also based on registered voters.

But there is a second figure. CNE reports that in the municipalities 78,024 people transferred and handed in their old voters card and were given a new one. Further, 151,277 people said their card was lost or stolen. They, too, were given new voters cards and new 2003 registration numbers. With the new registrations, these total 602,627 people. CNE also has a figure for the 2003 register, which is 608,453 – this is 5826 more than those who registered.

The old 1999 registers should be cleaned, to remove those who have died (at least 110,000 people) as well as those who transferred and were given new cards. But taking people off the role is hard, because it cannot be done electronically. The computerised voters register uses a simple software system, Access, which is limited to 40,000 files per data base. Thus the voters are on hundreds of different data bases, and cannot be moved or removed electronically.

CNE says the size of the 1999 register has only shrunk to 1,818,773. That means that nearly all the people who transferred or who lost their cards are actually registered twice. Adding these two figures gives a total of 2,431,221 currently on the register.

So we have two official figures of registration: **2,208,892 is the official figure of the number of voters** which was initially used to allocate seats and the 1%, and **2,431,221 is the number of names actually on the register**, including duplications.

Which one to use? On which do you base turnout?

Even the municipalities and CNE are confused. Municipalities in announcing intermediate results and the CNE in the posted results mostly used the larger number actually on the register, but some, including Angoche, Quelimane, Xai-Xai and Mocimboa da Praia, used the smaller official figure. Milange uses a figure half way in between.

Calculating assembly seats

The number of seats in a municipal assembly is dependent on the number of registered voters, and is in bands (20,000 to 30,000 voters gives 17 seats, 30,000 to 40,000 voters gives 21 seats, and so on). The initial announcement of seats on 20 August was based on the smaller official figure.

It appears that in recalculating the number of seats for the 11 December announcement, the CNE shifted to the number of voters posted on 8 December, which for 28 municipalities is the number of names on the register, including duplications. This resulted in 7 cities gaining seats and Marrromeu losing seats.

For most cities it makes no difference, but Xai-Xai ends up with too few seats, 31 instead of 39, because the CNE continued to use the smaller official number rather than number on the register with duplications as it did for other cities.

In addition, the CNE has incorrectly calculated the number of seats for Inhambane and Nampula.

1 million registered twice?

At a national level, 750,000 people either transferred or replaced their cards. These people will be on the register next year. They will be joined by perhaps another 250,000 who will join the 2004 register as transfers or lost cards. In other words, there could be one million people on the voters roll twice.

Can these be used for fraud? It has become clear that when people transfer and hand in their cards, these cards are not perforated or cancelled in any way – they still look like any valid registration card and still correspond to a name on the voters roll. At least 235,000 such cards are floating around the system. These are supposed to be destroyed when these people are removed from the old 1999 voters list, but this does not seem to be happening.

On 27 November people in Nampula discovered a pile of rubbish from STAE which had been improperly dumped in a stream. In it were bags containing thousands of voters cards from people who had transferred. Renamo alleged that they were being used for fraud. In fact, this would be hard on two grounds. First, if a person tried to actually use the card to vote, they would run the risk that someone would recognise that they were not the named voter. Second, it would require finding someone who is not registered and had not voted, because dipping the index finger in indelible ink really does prevent multiple voting. There cannot be many people who are not registered and who would be willing to vote illegally.

Nonetheless, having so many extra people on the voters roll does provide a potential for fraud, especially if the computer system could be manipulated to have some of these people “vote”.

Voters appear & disappear

Analysing registration becomes much more complicated, however, because there are two different sets of figures for both 1999 and 2003 registration. The “official figure” cited above is just the old 1999 figure plus, more or less, new 2003 registrations. But STAE also has internal figures for 1999 and 2003 registration books, which do not correspond.

Some updating goes on constantly, and this would explain small differences, but not some of the large ones. For 2003 the biggest difference is Lichinga, where 11,124 people are said to have registered this year (new plus transfers plus lost cards), but the 2003 register contains 15,389 names. In contrast, in Matola 72,583 people registered, but only 69,520 appear on the books.

Similar problems occur with the 1999 register, where the totals of the official and internal figures are similar, but individual cities are different. Marromeu, which had a very tight race in this election, has lost half its 1999 registered voters – the 1999 total was reduced from 20,983 to 10,473. Manjacaze also lost nearly half its 1999 voters. Where did those voters go? Yet Xai-Xai's 1999 voter roll jumped from 44,161 to 51,449. Since new registrations go in new books, where did these extra voters come from?

What this shows is that Mozambique does not have a clean electoral register. The EU explicitly says the register is not reliable. And the 2004 registration will only complicate matters, leading to more registration books and further different sets of numbers.

Why the real turnout was 28%

We calculate that the real turnout in this election was 28%. What is this based on?

First, with three exceptions, we start with the official figures published by the CNE on 20 August. These are more accurate than the number in the registration books, because they do not include transfers and new cards. Next we reduce Beira by 10,000 to account for the 10 polling stations not counted and Chimoio by 1000 because one polling station there was excluded. Next, we reduce this figure by 5% as a rough estimate of voters who have died. This gives an estimate of the real size of the voters roll.

Two exceptions are Manjacaze and Marromeu, where the number of voters on the 1999 list dropped dramatically. We take the new 1999 figure plus new inscriptions, to get 6618 for Manjacaze and 15,277 for Marromeu. The other exception is Monapo, where the CNE actually reduced its estimates of the number of voters after August, but this still seems wrong and we use the 1999 figure plus new registrations: 26,701.

Thus we estimate the actual turnout for the 33 municipalities to be as follows (with our estimate of the number of actual potential voters in brackets):

Lichinga	32%	(44 703)
Cuamba	17%	(38 226)
Metangula	34%	(4 595)
Pemba	31%	(51 409)
Montepuez	43%	(27 240)
Mocimboa da Praia	46%	(15 750)
Nampula	15%	(182 940)
Nacala	36%	(80 417)
Angoche	35%	(42 030)
Monapo	21%	(26 701)
Ilha de Moçambique.	34%	(25 697)
Quelimane	28%	(85 353)
Mocuba	21%	(29 688)
Gurué	21%	(21 323)
Milange	25%	(10 211)
Tete	40%	(54 994)
Moatize	47%	(14 331)
Chimoio	27%	(86 184)
Manica	38%	(11 837)
Catandica	43%	(7 329)
Beira	28%	(206 065)
Dondo	35%	(32 260)
Marromeu	29%	(15 277)
Inhambane	29%	(26 390)
Maxixe	19%	(44 691)
Vilankulo	29%	(13 531)
Xai-Xai	38%	(52 314)
Chokwé	45%	(25 314)
Chibuto	41%	(26 769)
Mandlakazi	31%	(6 618)
Manhiça	35%	(21 536)

Matola	25%	(222 608)
Maputo	26%	(507 842)
todos 33	28%	(2 062 169)

31 sem Matola
e Maputo 29% (1 331 720)

Poor civic education or active abstention?

The lack of civic education and the weak participation of civil society was a major reason for the relatively low turnout, said Artemiza Franco, director of the Centre for the Investigation of Human Rights and Development (Centro de Pesquisa dos Direitos Humanos e Desenvolvimento). Other civic figures have also been quoted as blaming civic education.

But this has been widely challenged, and many commentators have argued that this was an active abstention which, at least in part, reflects a distrust of politicians and government. “The government is playing with people, because the candidates make many promises, but afterwards they just sit in the municipal offices, forget the people, and only make life more difficult for people so they can eat,” commented one person interviewed by observers in Nampula from AMODE (Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Democracia, Mozambican Association for Development of Democracy).

Another said “we would prefer the government to simply appoint officials in Nacala rather than try to fool the public that there are possibilities of change when the government really isn't interested.” Another commented “the people are tired of choosing candidates who then simply increase taxes, for example for rubbish which they don't actually collect”.

A letter in the daily *Notícias* on 22 November was headlined “voting is for show”. In it, letter-writer Alcindes Bazima said “we are tired of leaders who do nothing for us.” We are voting only to select the set of people who will be corrupt and get rich at our expense. “The people are tired of politicians who only talk to us near election time, to make promises that are never fulfilled.”

Otilia Aquino, executive director of AMODE, noted that independent and small party candidates had done badly. This suggests that “our opposition is abstention” rather than voting for candidates not in the main parties. But she concludes that the small parties and independents only have themselves to blame, because they failed to convince voters to vote for them instead of abstaining.

1% disenfranchised

Up to 1% of the people on the voters roll are disenfranchised. People can only vote at the polling station where they are registered. But the polling station staff and party delegates are often assigned to work in other polling stations than their own. Journalists, drivers, police and others have the same problem. Some are assigned to their own polling stations; others work close enough to take time off and run to their own polling station. But many are too far away, so cannot vote. With an average of 10 people assigned to each polling station, this means up to 1% of registered voters cannot vote.

High turnout in Mocimboa da Praia

A particularly hard fought contest led to a very high turnout in Mocimboa da Praia. In 1999, the vote was 54% for Renamo, which targeted the city for a strong campaign and named a good candidate for president, Jaide Assane. Frelimo was anxious to retain the town, and its candidate was the existing president, Camissa Adamo Abdala, who was respected for his administration during five years and for expanding the water system.

AMODE's candidates forum in Mocimboa drew the largest attendance of the AMODE forums – 380 people.

On polling day the turnout was the second highest in country, 46%. And the race was one of the closest, Camissa Abdala gained 3,516 votes compared to Jaide Assane's 3,319, a difference of just 197.

In 1st decision, Constitutional Council reinstates candidate

Jose Manteigas, the Renamo-UE candidate for president (mayor) of Mocuba, was put back on the ballot paper by the Constitutional Council, in its first-ever ruling on Monday 17 November. The National Election Commission (CNE) had approved Manteigas, then later rejected him.

Mocuba was a key target for Renamo, because the party had gained 60% of the vote in the 1999 national elections.

Renamo demanded that the election there be delayed, on the grounds that it had no time to campaign for its candidate – and it seems likely that many of its supporters in more rural parts of Mocuba did not know that Manteigas had been put back on the ballot. The CNE rejected the request; it had had an alternative set of ballot papers printed in case this happened, and the election went ahead as planned. Manteigas lost, gaining only 25% of the vote.

After first approving Manteigas, the CNE rejected him on the grounds that he had not been resident in Mocuba for six months, as required by law. Although the CNE normally works by consensus, this was a split decision on party lines. Renamo appealed to the Constitutional Council, which reversed the decision and reinstated Manteigas, on the grounds that the CNE had provided no proof, and only "indications" that perhaps Manteigas was not resident. To exclude Manteigas, proof was required.

The decision is particularly ironic, because on 14 November the CNE announced that it was rejecting complaints by Renamo and Monamo because no proof had been provided. CNE spokesperson Filipe Mandlate said that "accusations must be accompanied by proof. The CNE cannot be expected to investigate all accusations." The Constitutional Council told the CNE exactly the same thing.

The issue came up because Manteigas had submitted two certificates of residence, one for the Marmanelo neighbourhood (bairro) and one for Carreira de Tiro. Frelimo said this was clearly fraudulent, because someone cannot live in two different neighbourhoods. Renamo responded that after the first residence certificate was issued, Marmanelo was split in half and Manteigas' half was renamed Carreira de Tiro. This is quite common in rapidly growing urban areas. This, too, is ironic, because Renamo alleged that boundaries of some municipalities had been changed, when what happened in reality was exactly this splitting of some large neighbourhoods into two different administrative units.

Constitutional council

The Constitutional Council, although called for in the 1990 constitution, had never been appointed. But it plays a crucial role in elections, overseeing the entire electoral process, validating the final election results, and deciding on any election complaints. Until now, this role has been played by the Supreme Court, but as part of the agreement with Renamo to go ahead with local elections, the Council has now been named.

Three members were elected by Parliament. Two were named by Frelimo, parliament member and former minister Teodato Hunguana and the director of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) law faculty, Lucia Ribeiro. Renamo-UE named the well known lawyer Orlando da Graca.

The chairman of the Council, the respected lawyer and former minister Rui Baltazar, was appointed by President Joaquim Chissano. These first four members selected the fifth member of the Council, Joao Ubisse Nguenha, who is the director of the legislative services of the Mozambican parliament and a lecturer in constitutional law at UEM.

Unexplained delays create tension

The CNE just met its deadline of 4 December for announcing the results, but the process again proved extremely slow, raising questions about its ability to handle eight times as many votes in national elections next year.

The first problem was that provincial election commissions were very slow in sending material to Maputo. Results summaries (editais) and full minutes (actas) of each polling station, as well as all spoiled ballot papers (nullos), must be sent to the National Election Commission. Ten days after the election, and four days before results were to be announced, material from Nacala and Chimoio still had not arrived. In the case of Chimoio, it appears that the provincial election commission simply left the material out of the package when it sent material from the other two cities in Manica province, and did not realise until told by the CNE.

The second problem was that intermediate results at city level were done by simply adding up the editais. But at national level, the results are computerised and the system is programmed to reject editais with errors. Although editais are agreed by all members of the polling station staff and by party delegates, errors are often made in writing them up late at night by lamplight. Often the numbers do not add up correctly. Sometimes this can be corrected by checking the actas. But other errors cannot be resolved and some polling stations end up being excluded. This delayed the announcement of results by at least one day.

The CNE itself works very slowly. Substantial amounts of time was wasted on bureaucratic matters such as logging in receipt of material from the provinces. It did not start reconsideration of the nulos until nearly all had arrived in Maputo. For this election it was not a problem. Only two elections were seen as close enough for CNE members themselves to reconsider the nulos, Marromeu and Mocimboa da Praia. Other nulos were reclassified by STAE members, and the process went quickly.

Finally, the CNE left until last the contentious issue of protests. In 1999, the counting and reclassification of nulos took so long that the CNE never bothered to reconsider editais with errors and never looked at the protests. This time, Renamo correctly insisted that the protests – many of which are minor local issues and are only mentioned in the actas – should at least be discussed. This delayed publication of results for another day. Many of these could have been considered earlier, especially in the first week after the election when the CNE had little work of significance.

CNE rejects all protests

The CNE rejected all 18 protests and complaints. The CNE can order that an election be run again in a single polling station or an entire city, but the law is clear that this can only be done if there was an improper action “which could influence the result” (art 139)

The CNE said that independent of the validity of the complaints, none would affect the outcome. Most of the complaints were minor, although some related to the general pattern of missing registration books. (see page 7) One pair of complaints was more serious, however.

Citizens lists in Ilha de Moçambique and Angoche submitted formal protests to the National Election Commission (CNE) asking that the vote be annulled and carried out again. Ballot papers in both cities had a blank space instead of a symbol for the presidential candidates and lists of the two groups, Unidos pela Ilha (UPI) and Grupo Independente de Desenvolvimento de Angoche (GIDA). Many voters are illiterate, so symbols are important.

The CNE accepted that the two groups submitted their symbols on time and that the fault lay in Maputo, but said that having symbols would not change the results. But it also argued privately that there was simply no money to rerun any of the elections.

In addition 16 protests from Renamo were rejected:

- On four protests, the CNE said the claimed events did not change the result. These include the acknowledged problems in Beira, two complaints about registration books in Nampula and one about registration books in Quelimane.
- Three protests were rejected for lack of evidence. These include a claim that provincial election officials included three extra edital sheets in Chimoio, a claim that police had intimidated voters in Cuamba, and claims that a seal had been changed on a sack of documents from Marromeu (implying it had been opened and resealed)
- Renamo submitted names of people they said were on the register and voted, but lived outside the city – 82 in Montepuez, 4 in Maputo and several in Mocimboa da Praia and Quelimane. The CNE said that the law says that protests over improper registration must be made after the registration, and not at the time of voting.
- Renamo said that when the polling stations closed at 1800 in Manica, all its party delegates had been expelled, so they could not monitor the count. The CNE confirmed that two had indeed been expelled because they were not registered to vote in Manica, but after the intervention of the CNE they were allowed back into the polling stations. In any case, the votes of these two polling stations could not change the results.
- In Quelimane, Renamo submitted a protest saying that the Frelimo candidate had received only 49.9% of the vote, that this had been improperly rounded up to 50%, and this meant there should be a second round. The CNE showed that this was a mathematical error by Renamo, and the Frelimo candidate gained more than 52%.

- In two cities Renamo protested about the improper classification of valid votes as invalid ones (nulos), but the CNE said this was a pointless protest, as all nulos are individually reconsidered by the CNE.
- There was also a complaint about the improper disposal on 28 November of electoral materials in Nampula, including voters cards handed in by people who transferred. The CNE could not see how this would affect the result.

This is the first time that the CNE has actually considered all complaints in detail and reported the outcome of their deliberation.

CNE: protests must have proof

Renamo retaliated to the exclusion of its candidate in Mocuba by challenging two Frelimo presidential candidates. It said that the Xai-Xai presidential candidate had not been resident for six months. At a meeting on Saturday 15 November, the CNE asked Renamo to provide proof of its allegation, but Renamo said the CNE should investigate. The CNE then rejected the claim on the grounds that all claims must be accompanied by proof, and that the CNE cannot be expected to investigate every allegation.

Renamo's final claim, however, caused more problems. It says that the Frelimo candidate for president in Manhica, Alberto Chicuamba, is not eligible because he had resigned from the assembly. Article 6 of the electoral law does say that a person cannot be a candidate if they resigned in the previous term, but it is not clearly drafted. Frelimo says it only applies to standing for the same office, in other words for assembly, and that president is a different office, while Renamo says it applies to any municipal office. The CNE split, on party lines, and this issue was remitted to the Constitutional Council.

Is an X on the face a valid vote?

To vote for president, voters are expected to put an X or + or fingerprint in a little box next to the name, picture and party symbol of the presidential candidate. But what happens if they put an X on the picture of the candidate or a fingerprint on the name?

If the voter writes a word on the ballot paper, votes for more than one candidate, or puts random marks on the paper, then the ballot paper is clearly considered spoiled (nulo). But the law is clear that a vote is valid if the mark "shows, unmistakably, the will of the voter" (art 86) Thus, an X or fingerprint on a face, party symbol or name is valid so long as the choice is clear. This is normally made clear to polling station staff in their training.

In this election, polling station staff ruled that 3.6% of ballot papers were spoiled. All spoiled ballot papers are reconsidered by the National Election Commission, to ensure that a uniform criteria is used. And it is clear that there is a huge variation in the training and judgements of polling station staff. Of nulos from Gurué, Xai-Xai and Matola, less than 3% were considered valid. While of nulos from Lichinga, Milange, Nacala, Angoche and Maputo, more than one-third were considered valid by the CNE and added to the totals of the candidates.

Because Renamo voters tend to be poorer and less literate, Renamo is the main gainer from revalidated nulos. Renamo often claims that Frelimo-biased polling station staff reject ballot papers where the X or fingerprint is on the Renamo candidate's picture, and it filed formal protests in this respect in Monapo and Marromeu.

Looking closely at the Monapo results suggests Renamo's complaint is justified. In Monapo, 8% of presidential votes were classified as nulo, but the CNE considered that an unprecedented 68% of those ballots were actually valid. It was a very close race, and 240 of the 305 re-qualified votes went to the Renamo candidate. In the end, the Renamo candidate lost by only 77 votes – clearly the nulos matter in a close race.

Ilha de Moçambique was an even more stark example, where polling station staff considered a record 12.5% of votes to be invalid. The CNE concluded that 30% of those actually were valid. Nearly all went to Renamo, and the re-qualified votes were enough to give Renamo an extra seat on the municipal assembly.

Lost second ballot paper

All voters receive two ballot papers, one for president and one for municipal assembly, and put those ballot papers into two separate ballot boxes with the polling station presiding officer (presidente) watching. Thus one would expect the total number of votes for president and for assembly to be almost the same, and this is generally true.

But there were some curious exceptions. In Lichinga, 4.4% of voters – 616 people – voted for president but not for assembly. In Gurué 6% of voters – 270 people – voted for assembly but not president. Yet observers did not comment on people failing to put ballot papers into the second box. Where did those second ballot papers go?

Comment

Worrying lack of computer transparency

Computerisation of the results is both essential and, as Renamo showed in Beira, possible to make transparent. Unfortunately, the present CNE/STAE process is extremely non-transparent. It is not possible to check the software or the results in any useful way.

Checking the results requires four things:

- 1) The ability to check each polling station to see if the input data agrees with copies of the editais.
- 2) A record of changes, for example when an edital does not add up and data is taken from the longer record, the acta.
- 3) A clear record of where requalified nulos have been added.
- 4) The ability to add up the columns to make sure summation is correct.

As Renamo showed with its Beira parallel count, this can be done with a spreadsheet or other simple system. Of course, Beira had only 260 polling stations, whereas the national election next year is likely to have 10,000. This surely requires that the results be displayed on a website, rather than simply printed out, as Renamo did in Beira. Dividing the website by province would be sensible and be much easier to work with.

This is important because the present presentation system makes it too easy and too tempting to cheat. The results from 1999 have now been released on CD, but they are only broken down to polling centre level – that is, to the level of a school but not an individual classroom. This makes it almost impossible to check, because editais are for individual polling stations, not centres.

The danger is that additional polling stations could be added to polling centres and no one would know. A school might have polling stations in eight classrooms, but it would be relatively easy to add one or two extra polling stations or to increase the vote in the existing ones, because no one would have any way of checking.

Of course the people running the computer system are honest and trustworthy, but what the Beira fiasco showed is that lower level people can step in and try to manipulate the result.

Without a much clearer presentation that allows the answering of the four questions above, there is no reason for anyone to trust the computer system.

– Joseph Hanlon

First-ever recount in Ilha

The City Election Commission in Ilha de Moçambique conducted Mozambique's first-ever recount after it found indications of ballot box stuffing, reports our correspondent Julio Paulino of *Wampula Fax*.

As the presidential count progressed, in three polling stations the election commission found 44, 14 and 12 extra ballot papers – that is, more ballot papers than there were voters. After that, the election commission decided to recount the votes in all 38 polling stations, and this took two or three days. Observers and the press were not allowed to compare the recounts with the original editais, so it is impossible to tell if there were significant differences. But the recount confirmed the 70 extra ballot papers. The intermediate result was based on the recount, but the Frelimo vice president of the city election commission refused to sign the commission's report of the results, because of the extra ballots.

In fact, the election law specifically covers this possibility (Lei n.º 19/2002, art 82) and says that in this case, the ballots in the box should be counted so long as there are not more than the total number of voters registered.

There are two reasons for this. First, it sometimes happens that the scrutineer (escrutinador) fails to tick off the name of the voter in the register, which leads to more ballots than names ticked off of voters. Second, one of the key jobs of a party delegate is to ensure that no one introduces extra ballot papers into the ballot box. If they party delegate fails to do this, then it is too late to raise the issue during the count.

Bureaucratic demands thwart candidates

Candidates for both president and assembly have to present five pieces of paper: authenticated photocopies of their identity card and voters card, a certificate of no criminal record, a certificate that they are on the electoral register, and evidence that they have lived in the municipality for six months. In addition, all candidates for president, whether standing on a party list or as an independent, must have signatures of 1% of the electorate of the municipality.

As in past elections, it proved very difficult for candidates to pull together all of the required documents. On 10 October, the CNE announced that of 96 nominations for president, only the 33 candidates from Frelimo had correct nomination papers. All the others had errors, most commonly not having signatures of 1% of registered voters.

Parties and candidates then had five days to correct the papers and resubmit them. However Renamo, and no other group, had an extra two weeks, because it had been allowed to send people from its national office in Maputo into the CNE to go over the submitted nomination forms in detail and correct irregularities. CNE member and spokesman Filipe Mandlate said “we have to admit that in doing this, we violated the principle of equity, because no other political force was given this chance.”

Even with this extra time Renamo was not able to obtain enough valid signatures for its candidate for Maputo president, Artur Vilanculos. Renamo then demanded a “political” solution, and after several days of deadlock, the CNE agreed to accept all Renamo candidates, whether or not they met the conditions required by law.

In the end 81 candidates were accepted – 33 Renamo and 33 Frelimo, plus 9 independent or citizens list candidates, 5 from IPADE, and 1 from PIMO, the Mozambique Independent Party. However 15 were excluded.

Peaceful campaign with few incidents

A calm and peaceful campaign was consistently reported by our correspondents in the 33 municipalities. Even when rallies of opposing parties occurred near to each other, or when caravans of cars or marches of opposing parties met, there was little trouble.

Extensive Frelimo use of state vehicles was a common observation of several *MPPB* correspondents and other observers. In general, Frelimo had more money for its campaigns and staged more elaborate rallies, in the form of what it calls “showmicos” – a Brazilian combination of the English word “show” and the Portuguese word “comicio” or public meeting.

Despite the broadly calm tone of the campaign, some incidents were reported. There were skirmishes and minor punch-ups between groups of youth from Renamo and Frelimo in most municipalities, and the odd incidents of stone throwing. There were widespread complaints of both sides tearing down posters of the other side, and even a few arrests. Such incidents were not too common nor did they cause any serious difficulties or injuries. And they had less to do with politics and more to do with young men trying to prove themselves and working out their aggressions.

Among the more serious incidents, in Tete, a Renamo supporter was arrested after he allegedly threw stones at a Frelimo car, injuring the driver. In Xai-Xai there are reports of Frelimo supporters beating three people leaving a Renamo rally and stoning a Renamo car.

In Xai-Xai three Renamo candidates for municipal assembly were arrested and held for 24 hours by the police for allegedly tearing a Frelimo t-shirt off a woman on the street and beating three people in the ensuing scuffle. Police confirmed the arrest and the woman whose t-shirt was torn off repeated her allegation to our correspondent, Carlos Mula. Nevertheless, the detention was illegal. Article 5 of the election law says candidates can only be arrested if they are caught “in the act” (“em flagrante delito”) of committing a serious crime.

There have been few complaints about the operations of STAE at local level, but in Beira, our correspondents confirmed Renamo allegations that at least some polling station staff had been hired on the basis of Frelimo party connections, rather than through open hiring as was supposed to occur.

Wild accusations

In many places, the main parties have emphasised harsh accusations against the opposition, rather than promoting a positive message about their own party. Our correspondent in Nacala, Estevao Malunga, reports that at a rally in the Quissimajulo barrio, Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama said he had proof that Frelimo was buying voters cards from Renamo supporters for 200,000 meticias each (about \$8). And he called on his members to detain any Frelimo person who tried to buy their voters card.

On the other side, Margarida Talapa, head of the Frelimo brigade in the province, said she had proof that men who had been Portuguese soldiers in Nacala in the colonial era had returned and were telling young people they would get large sums of money if Renamo wins the election.

Meanwhile, in Catandica, the Renamo presidential candidate, Verdiano Manivete, said that Frelimo is giving children cookies (bolaschas) if they tear down Renamo posters.

Benjamin Cortéz, Renamo district head in Nacala, warned voters to take their own pens to the polling stations because Frelimo had supplied the polling stations with special pens where the ink disappears in five minutes.

Smooth voting day with praise for staff

Across the country, voting went smoothly and without problems, other than widespread difficulties linked to the voters register (see articles on page 7). There was high praise for polling station staff, who had received ten days of training with more simulations and practical experience than in the past. As required, there was always a staff member who spoke the local language. Explanations of how to vote were good.

Material arrived at polling stations on time, and with the exception of voters rolls, the kit supplied by STAE was normally correct. Staff set up the polling stations correctly and competently. Polling stations opened on time, or within an hour of the official opening time. Polling stations closed correctly and the count was done impeccably.

Campaigning in and around polling stations is illegal, and remains uncommon, but it was more of an issue this year than in the past and observers reported more incidents. Campaigning in queues was noted in a number of places; Frelimo and Renamo delegates inside polling stations were also accused of improperly encouraging people to vote for their candidate. This was nearly always dealt with quickly by the polling station president. There was one arrest in Mocuba and two in Chimoio for campaigning in a queue, and one in Catandica for more general campaigning on polling day.

Also of note was the tendency of well known people to stay in the polling centre (typically a school) after they had voted, and to greet and talk to people. This tended to be Frelimo or government people or Renamo MPs, but our correspondent in Monapo reported that in Napacaia bairro, two traditional leaders were actually arrested when they stayed around after voting and began encouraging people to vote for one of the parties.

Despite the low turnout, there were some queues, particularly at polling stations for people who registered this year. There were some complaints about lack of crowd control, which is the responsibility of two "auxiliaries" who sometimes were not present. In general elections, the polling station equipment comes with books of numbered tickets (senhas). These tickets are handed out to people as they arrive so they can wait in the shade away from the polling station, and people continue to vote in order, handing in their ticket as they enter the polling station. With the low turnout in local elections senhas were not seen as needed. But they were used in Montepuez at the Escola Primaria de Nacate, and the Renamo delegate objected, even though it is normal in national elections. The use of senhas was stopped rather than create controversy.

There were very few incidents. Some include:

- Two attempts to tamper with ballot boxes were reported by our correspondent in Nacala. Police arrested the president of a polling station in Muanona for trying to open a ballot box when no one else was there. Police also arrested a delegate of the citizens list Ocina in the Nacala bairro of Quissimajulo when he was caught trying to put extra ballot papers in the ballot box.
- In Ampapa in Ilha de Moçambique, in the evening during the partial count, the Frelimo party delegate in one polling station was forced to flee when he was threatened by a large Renamo crowd outside the polling station waiting for the count.
- In Vilankulo three Renamo party agents were arrested for using false credentials. The three had been substituted by Renamo when the people named on the credentials had not appeared, but the police said such a switch was illegal.
- Zaida Nuno was accused of trying to vote twice in Montepuez. She arrived with her right index finger bandaged and offered to dip her left index finger in the ink. After some discussion, she was asked to remove the bandage, which showed that the finger had already been dipped in ink and she had already voted, notes our correspondent in Montepuez.

1000 observers watched the election

There were more than 900 independent domestic observers and 150 foreign observers watching this election.

On the domestic side, FECIV had 110 observers and AMODE, working with 22 local NGOs, had 288 observers, and both covered all 33 municipalities. Both also observed the 1999 elections. The Electoral Observatory is a new coalition of CEDE, AMODE and the Islamic and Christian councils and had 450 observers in 10 municipalities. AWEPA had 87 domestic observers in seven cities.

The biggest group of foreign observers was 60 from the European Union plus Switzerland; some came from Europe and others are from embassies in Maputo. The United States, Canada, Italy, Finland, Norway and Britain put together a team of 28 observers, mostly from local embassies and trained by UNDP. The Carter Centre had 15 observers. The CPLP (Portuguese speaking countries) had 5 observers, and there was also a small Commonwealth team.

Observers and party delegates have the right to be present throughout the entire process, from the opening of the polling station to the completion of the partial count, and during the intermediate count at municipality level.

Nevertheless, observers were under tighter restrictions than in past elections. In particular, they were banned from the reconsideration of spoiled ballot papers (nulos) at national level and thus from much of the process of the final count by the CNE. This ban was imposed even though the observer regulations, adopted by the CNE itself on 24 October, allow observers to “accompany the activity of the National Election Commission” (art 2). International observers were banned from the intermediate count in Tete, while national observers were allowed in to watch.

The regulations also give observers “freedom of movement in the entire national territory” (art 22), but this was restricted in some places. Although it was not specified in the regulations, the CNE insisted that observers specify a province in their application. The observer badge which was issued did not specify a province, but the certificate which came with it did. International observer teams always change allocations of people at the last minute, for example to fill gaps. In most places, this caused no problem, and badges were accepted anywhere.

Three international observers, one each from the EU, Carter Center and Britain, were stopped from observing by provincial or district election commissions because their credential stated a different province.

The problem was most intense in Tete. The banned EU observer simply stayed in her hotel. The banned Carter Center observer continued to go around in the car with a properly accredited observer, being careful not to enter polling stations, but was soon met by a senior STAE official who warned the observer not to continue “or you will leave here in handcuffs”. After a flurry of telephone calls, CNE and STAE officials decided that “freedom of movement” is not the same as freedom to observe anywhere, and that the Carter Center observer could only travel around to polling stations if he did not leave the car.

Carter also ran into trouble with its logo, in use since the Centre was founded in 1982, which is a stylised eagle's head. Unfortunately, it bears a resemblance to the partridge (perdiz) used by Renamo as its symbol, and some officials accused the Carter Centre of campaigning for Renamo. Many Carter observers then removed t-shirts and other information which used the eagle logo.

Jaime Cuambe, the political editor of the government-owned daily *Notícias*, on 24 November strongly attacked international observers, saying they came with "a very clear agenda" to support Renamo and "prevent an alleged fraud by Frelimo".

High praise from foreign observers

"Both the electoral campaign and the election day took place in a calm atmosphere free from intimidation, without any serious incidents or irregularities to remark. ... The secrecy of the vote was respected."

- European Union Election Observation Mission

"Mozambique's second municipal elections were well conducted and peaceful. ... local polling station staff are to be congratulated for the conduct of all aspects of the polling process on election day."

- Carter Center

Foreign observers should stop trying to turn voting booths

International observers always disagree with one aspect of the Mozambican voting process – which way the voting booth should face. In Mozambique, the voting booth, where the elector actually marks the ballot paper, is open on the side toward the polling station staff (mesa). This makes it easy, after a voter has left the booth, to check that no stickers or leaflets for candidates have been left behind. Britain is another country that uses this position. But most European countries turn the voters booth the other way, so that the opening faces a wall. This gives the voter more privacy, but makes it much harder to check for campaign material.

Training of polling station staff, as well as the drawing in the manual, are clear as to the position. Nevertheless, international observers often tell polling station staff that this is wrong, which happened again this year. One EU observer even told the *MPPB* that the drawing in the manual was only supposed to show relative placement, and not orientation.

Perhaps for the next election, leaders of foreign observer teams in their training should actually tell their observers that Mozambique considered the two possibilities, and made a conscious choice as to which way the polling booth should face.

Parties keep an eye on the process

Every party or independent candidate or list has the right to have a party "delegate" in every polling station during the voting and counting. This is an essential measure to prevent misconduct, since the parties are able to watch every step of the process.

Deadline for accreditation of party delegates was extended by the CNE to 17 November, just two days before the election, to give parties maximum opportunity. Party delegates were present from Frelimo and Renamo in most polling stations, although some Renamo delegates were missing in the south. Representation of other parties and independents was patchy.

Candidates not backed by their predecessors

Several Frelimo presidential candidates campaigned without support of their predecessors, who often did not even appear on the same platform with them.

Because of the 1998 boycott by the opposition, Frelimo members were presidents of all 33 municipalities. But Frelimo selected only 13 of them to stand again. Some, such as Artur Canana in Maputo, were notoriously bad and deserved to be replaced, but others had begun campaigning for re-election, with local support, when the party at national level told them they could not stand again. The only woman president, Laura Tamele of Manhiça, who had a good local reputation, was replaced by a

man, and all 33 presidents are now men. Only one-fifth of the new candidates have local government experience.

In some cases such as Maputo, where Frelimo's new candidate Enéas Comiche was campaigning hard against his Frelimo predecessor, the new candidate was probably happy to keep the old president out of sight. But in other places nominations from Maputo created substantial local bitterness, and some retiring presidents refused to support the campaign of their successors. Indeed, some abstained rather than vote for an imposed successor.

In Beira, Lourenço Bulha, president (speaker) of the municipal assembly, and municipal president Chivavice Muchangage had both begun campaigning, and threatened to split the party in a nasty internal war. Frelimo imposed Djalma Lourenço but he proved unpopular within the local party, and was exposed as having been dismissed for corruption 20 years ago. The pro-Frelimo Sunday newspaper *Domingo* (30 November) suggested the party would have been better sticking with Bulha, who had gained some support in his campaign.

Renamo, too, imposed its candidates from the centre, and made some poor choices. It may have lost cities like Chimoio, which it hoped to win, because imposed candidates had little local support.

– Adriana Nuvunga

Two teachers

The two candidates for president in Moatize have very similar backgrounds. Both Cassiano Marcelino of Frelimo and Fabiao Sozinho Bjingwe of Renamo-UE are teachers at the Instituto Medio de Geologia e Minas. Marcelino was trained in Cuba and Bjingwe in the Soviet Union. The two are also neighbours, reports our correspondent Otilia Bendito. The race between the neighbours should have been close, because Frelimo gained only 55% of the vote in 1999, but Marcelino won with 74% of the vote. The contest between the teachers triggered a high turnout of 47%.

Editors agreed code

Mozambican editors agreed a code of conduct for electoral coverage. Interesting points include:

- Journalists working in the media cannot also work actively for parties as press officers or make public statements for parties.
- Journalists should actually count the number of people at rallies and marches rather than use vague phrases like large or small.
- Journalists should avoid describing people as "curious", "furious", "disorganised", etc.

RM gave most coverage to Renamo

Radio Moçambique's national service gave more coverage to Renamo than any other party, according to a survey by the EU observer mission. Renamo-UE received 30% of coverage, Frelimo 25%, and IPADE 24%. Radio Cidade, the Maputo service of Radio Moçambique, was more balanced, giving 16% to Frelimo and Renamo-UE and 15% each to the independent candidates of AMAR and JPC. The mission's chief observer, José Maria Mendiluce, told a press conference that "we have a very positive impression of the public media".

The praise was really only for state-owned radio and television, however. The EU report notes that "the newspapers that are indirectly controlled by public entities, such as *Notícias*, displayed a bias in favour of the ruling party."

Comment

Who is afraid of transparency?

Radio Moçambique's effective effort to do its own count in many municipalities proves the transparency of Mozambique's election process. After each polling station closes, the ballots are immediately counted in the polling station, and an edital – a summary of the results – is posted outside the polling station.

Radio Moçambique, other journalists, and national and international observers all went around to polling stations, made copies of the results, and added them up.

The law requires the posting of editais on the polling station door precisely to encourage people to go around and collect this information, and this year it was used much more effectively than in the past.

The most important change in the law this year requires that party delegates in each polling station be given a copy of the edital. This allows each party to do its own count and check the official count. Tertuliano Juma MP, part of Renamo's election team in Nampula, told the *MPPB* "this year the count is not being questioned, because we have copies of the editais."

There were at least four different parallel counts -- by Frelimo, by Renamo, by RM, and by national observers grouped together in the Electoral Observatory. These counts cannot be perfect, but they are quite good. Frelimo's count is normally good. Only Renamo's Beira count was made available, but it was excellent. RM did well, particularly in smaller cities. The Electoral Observatory did very good full counts in seven cities; it also did counts based on samples in three large cities, which proved to be within a 2-4% of the intermediate results, which is reasonable for a sample.

This level of transparency makes it very hard to cheat, because too many people know the results, approximately at least, before the final official results are released. It also works the other way. When the results announced by the Constitutional Council are close to those of the parallel counts, no one will accuse the CNE of cheating.

Yet, Frelimo has always strongly opposed parallel counts. It succeeded in blocking such a count in 1999, and put heavy pressure on the organisations in the Electoral Observatory not to do a parallel count this year. And both Frelimo and Renamo prefer to keep the actions of the election commissions as secret as possible.

In the end, the only people who oppose transparency are the ones who want to cheat and not be seen, or who want to make political deals outside the spotlight.

But that time is passing. The success of parallel counts this year will make the impossible to oppose in next year's national election.

– Joseph Hanlon

Unclear boundaries cause confusion

The actual boundaries of municipalities are not well marked on the ground and people on the rural edges are often not sure if they live within the municipality or not. Similarly, when people register to vote, they normally go to the nearest school, without wondering if they are crossing an invisible line.

But this causes problems for local elections, because only the 25% of people actually living in municipalities are allowed to vote. The others can only vote in national elections.

This election saw bitter accusations by both sides of the other party bringing in people from outside the municipality to register and vote. CNE spokesman Filipe Mandlate noted that for 10 days after registration closed, the registers were available to be viewed by the parties. No one made any claims at that time of people being registered who lived outside the municipality, so it was a bit late to raise it on election day.

Boundaries of the 23 cities are defined by law, and have not changed since 1998. But the boundaries of the 10 towns (vilas) which were included in the list of municipalities as an experiment in decentralisation to smaller places are not defined in law – it never made any difference since the vilas were treated as part of the district. The Ministry of State Administration (MAE) defined boundaries for the 10 in 1998, and has expanded at least two, Monapo and Manhiça, to take account of expansion caused by population movement. Renamo accused the government of manipulating the boundaries for its own benefit.

The issue caused most tension in Monapo, in two large neighbourhoods of Napaia and Carapira. Renamo believed that these neighbourhoods would favour it, but MAE excluded them from the town. Then the CNE decided to include them, and they were able to vote, reports Carlos Tembe.

- In Mocuba, six people were arrested for trying to vote there, even though they lived some distance outside the city. A Carter Center observer was denounced by the local STAE head for trying to gain information about the incident. There was a similar arrest in Nacala.

Are neighbourhood secretaries biased?

Neighbourhood (bairro) secretaries were appointed many years ago in the one-party-state era as the lowest level of both party and government structures. They carry out semi-official government functions, such as signing certificates saying that people are resident, that couples live together, and so on. In particular, they provide the residence certificates that prove that candidates for municipal office actually live in the municipality. One problem is that many of the secretaries are staunch Frelimo loyalists and local party officials, but are using the semi-official neighbourhood post to harass opposition parties by delaying certificates of residence, by blocking opposition rallies, and by calling on the police to arrest opposition politicians. In some cases, neighbourhood secretaries demand money for signing essential documents.

In the bairro of Nutava-Rex in Nampula on 13 November, the bairro secretary told a crowd waiting for a Renamo rally that the rally was illegal and that anyone who stayed would be arrested. The crowd then dispersed and there was no one there when the candidate arrived, a local resident Saide Aly, told our correspondent Júlio Paulino.

Renamo has long complained about secretaries mixing their political and government roles, but it seems to have become more of a problem in this election. In municipalities that Renamo won, it will surely follow the Frelimo model and replace bairro secretaries with its own party militants. The secretaries are necessary and useful as the lowest tier of urban government, but it would be more better to regularise their appointment as non-party functionaries. Otherwise, the party in power will always see them as political appointees.

Tense calm in Montepuez

Despite substantial tension during the campaign, the election passed peacefully in Montepuez and Renamo accepted the victory of Frelimo in the city.

Turnout was a high 43%.

Montepuez, in Cabo Delgado province in the north, was the site of the worst violence in Mozambique since the end of the war more than a decade ago. On 9 November 2000 armed Renamo men attacked the town centre and 10 people were killed. A wave of arrests followed, and nearly 100 people suffocated to death in an overcrowded jail cell on 22 November 2000.

Tensions and violence reflect a number of local conditions. Montepuez was on a boundary between government and Renamo zones during the war, it has multiple local conflicts, and the closure of a major cotton factory caused an economic crisis.

The Centre of the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE), a Mozambican NGO headed by Brazao Mazula, a former head of the CNE, has been doing successful peace-building exercises for more than a year, which reduced tension. On 4 October 2003 a peace rally in Montepuez had both Frelimo and Renamo on the platform and attracted nearly 1000 people.

Police, neighbourhood secretaries, national officials of both parties, and the media have been accused of exacerbating tensions in Montepuez. CEDE officials accuse the press of only publishing exaggerated reports of violence and threats, while failing to report peace-building. Only the weekly *Zambeze* reported the 4 October peace rally, while all papers have reported violent incidents involving many fewer people. This, CEDE argues, helps to stoke tension.

In the build-up to the elections, Renamo argued that bairro secretaries called on the police to harass Renamo activists, and there is some evidence to support this. In one widely reported incident, a dance group had come to perform at Renamo rallies. The police took in the entire 60 person troupe for questioning, solely on the word of a neighbourhood secretary. In another case, police detained a Renamo activist, Abdala Marques, on the complaint of a neighbour who is a Frelimo official, and a local feud took on political content. In other incidents, police questioned Renamo activists only the word of neighbourhood secretaries or Frelimo militants. The result was growing tension in some neighbourhoods.

Our correspondent reports one incident in which a group of Renamo supporters stopped a government car which they said was carrying furniture to a Frelimo party rally, and beat the driver. Riot police (Policia de Intervenção Rapida) were sent into Montepuez on the Saturday before the election,

and they moved into the strongly Renamo neighbourhood of Nacate. All of this increased the tension in the days before the election,

One person close to the situation said the big problem was senior people coming in from outside and "who don't have the new spirit of Montepuez. They just treat the opposite side as the enemy, which is inappropriate there." This is compounded by the very hierarchical nature of Mozambican politics, in which everyone expects chiefs to be obeyed. It was difficult for local people to suggest to more senior visitors that their hard line was out of place, and it seems that in both Frelimo and Renamo some people wanted to keep tensions high. Local people felt squeezed by the parade of visiting high party officials from both Frelimo and Renamo, and felt they did not have the space to talk to each other and calm tensions. But calm was maintained and tensions have dissipated since the election.

One contact of the *MPPB* complained about international observers "who only drive around the centre of town where everything is fine, and don't into the bairros where there are problems."

AWEPA backing for local government

AWEPA, the European Parliamentarians for Africa, has been active in Mozambique since the anti-apartheid struggles of the 1980s. It has continued to support democratisation and decentralisation, and has published this *Bulletin* since 1992.

AWEPA has been helping the new local governments since the 1998 elections with an extensive programme of training and capacity building, sometimes in collaboration with the Ministry of State Administration and Ministry of Planning and Finance. Permanent staff and elected members of the municipal councils and assemblies of all 33 municipalities have been involved in AWEPA seminars and training. Special emphasis has been put on encouraging public participation and on gender.

The recent elections bring into office many people without experience of local government, and in the coming year AWEPA will run a series of seminars for these people, on municipal legislation, management and planning. It will also try to help these newly elected officials to look both up and down, with seminars on the relations with central government and on building more local participation. Other seminars will touch on the linked issues of gender and HIV/AIDS.

AWEPA had a special capacity building programme for the local elections. This included:

- seminars in eight cities for 560 political party leaders and cadre,
- training in seven cities for 417 trainers of political party election monitors (delegados de candidatura), and
- seminars in seven provincial capitals for more than 400 of the candidates themselves.

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